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This paper uses a multicountry macroeconometric model to estimate the
macroeconomic effects of the U.S. stimulus bill passed in February 2009. The
analysis has the advantage of taking into account many endogenous effects.
Real U.S. output is estimated to be $554 billion larger when summed over
the 12-year period 2009:1–2020:4 (0.29 percent of the total sum of output).
The average number of jobs is 509 thousand larger (0.37 percent). There is
some redistribution of output and employment away from 2012–2015. At
the end of 2020 the federal government debt is larger by $637 billion in real
terms (the debt/GDP ratio is larger by 3.19 percentage points), which may
increase the risk of negative asset-market reactions.
1 Introduction
This paper uses a structural multicountry macroeconometric model, denoted the
“MC” model, to analyze the macroeconomics effects of the U.S. stimulus bill
passed in February 2009. The policy changes are taken from a report issued on
March 2, 2009 by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2009). A baseline
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
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The results in this paper can be duplicated on the author’s website, and alternative experiments can
be done.
simulation is first run under the assumption that the stimulus bill passed (which
it did), and then a simulation is run with the stimulus taken out. The difference
between the predicted values from the two simulations for each variable and each
quarter is an estimate of the stimulus effects on that variable. The simulation period
is 2009:1–2020:4. Because the model is a multicountry model, the effects on other
countries are estimated in addition to the effects on the United States.
There is considerable controversy about the stimulus effects, and a number
of methodologies have been followed to estimate them. The CBO (2010) uses
results from two commercial forecasting models and the FRB-US model of the
Federal Reserve Board to choose ranges for a number of government spending
multipliers on output. These multipliers are then used to compute stimulus effects.
Additional equations are used to link output changes to changes in other variables,
like employment and the unemployment rate. The estimates are partial in that they
are not the result of solving a complete model. Many potential endogenous effects
are ignored. Also, as will be seen, the ranges chosen for the multipliers are large,
which leads to large ranges for the estimated stimulus effects.
Another procedure for estimating multipliers is what might be called a “reduced
form” procedure. The change in real GDP is regressed on the change in a policy
variable of interest and a number of other variables. The equation estimated is not,
however, a true reduced form equation because many variables are omitted, and so
the coefficient estimate of the policy variable will be biased if the policy variable
is correlated with omitted variables. The aim using this approach is to choose
a policy variable that seems unlikely to be correlated with the omitted variables.
Hall (2010) and Barro and Redlick (2010) are concerned with government spending
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multipliers and focus on defense spending during wars.1 Romer and Romer (2009)
are concerned with tax multipliers and use narrative records to choose what they
consider exogenous tax policy actions, i.e, actions that are uncorrelated with the
omitted variables.
This paper uses a model of the economy that captures many important features
of the world economy. It has been extensively tested, and it appears to be a good
approximation of the economy. It is briefly outlined in the next section. The
stimulus experiment that is performed is based on the solution of the entire model.
All the endogenous effects in the model are accounted for, including the effects of
the stimulus bill on the rest of the world and the effects of the rest of the world
responses back on the United States.
The methodology of structural macroeconometric modeling, which goes back
at least to Tinbergen (1939), does not have the problem of possible omitted variable
bias in reduced form equations, since reduced form equations are not directly esti-
mated. What is required is that the structural equations be consistently estimated.
Take, for example, a consumption or investment equation. If there are right hand
side endogenous variables, like current income or a current interest rate, and thus
correlation between these variables and the error term in the equation, this has to be
accounted for. Two stage least squares (2SLS) is one option. First stage regressors
must be found that are correlated with the endogenous variables and uncorrelated
with the error term. If one suspects that a current government spending or tax rate
variable depends on current endogenous variables, the variable would need to be
lagged one period before being used as a first stage regressor. The estimation is
1Barro and Redlick (2010) also estimate a tax multiplier.
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slightly more complicated if the error term in the structural equation is serially
correlated. In this case the 2SLS estimator can be modified to jointly estimate the
serial correlation coefficient and the structural coefficients—Fair (1970). The aim
in structural modeling is to find good structural equations—good approximations
to reality—and to estimate them consistently.2 Reduced form equations are not
estimated but derived, and there are many nonlinear restrictions on the reduced
form equations.
This structural approach uses much more information on the economy than
does the reduced form approach mentioned above. For example, the implicit
reduced form equation for U.S. output in the MC model is nonlinear and includes
hundreds of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables. There are also hundreds
of nonlinear restrictions on the reduced form coefficients. Given the complexity of
the economy, it seems unlikely that estimating reduced form equations with many
omitted variables and no restrictions from theory on the coefficients will produce
trustworthy results even if an attempt is made to account for omitted variable bias.
Another model building methodology is that of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models. This methodology is criticized in Fair (2009b), and
this discussion will not be repeated here. The main argument is that DSGE models
leave out too many features of the economy to be trustworthy for policy analysis.
Also, the models are based on the assumptions of labor market clearing and rational
expectations, which may not be realistic.
2Commercial forecasting models like the ones used by the CBO are not in the academic literature,
and so it is hard to evaluate them. It does not appear, however, that the structural equations in these
models are consistently estimated.
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2 The MC Model
The MC model is presented in Fair (2004), and it has been updated for purposes of
this paper (version dated January 30, 2010). The updated version is on the author’s
website. The U.S. part of the MC model will be denoted the “US model,” and the
rest of the model will be denoted the “ROW model.” Sometimes the US model
is analyzed by itself, but in this paper the entire MC model is used. The ability
of the US model to forecast recessions and booms is analyzed in Fair (2009a).
The MC model is completely estimated (by 2SLS); there is no calibration. The
estimation periods begin in 1954 for the US model and 1962 for the ROW model
and go through the latest data at the time of this study. The following is a brief
outline of the models.
US Model
In the US model there are three estimated consumption equations, three investment
equations, an import equation, four labor supply equations, two labor demand equa-
tions, a price equation, a nominal wage equation, two term structure of interest rate
equations, and an estimated interest rate rule of the Federal Reserve, among others.
In the interest rate rule the Fed responds to inflation and unemployment. There are
a total of 28 estimated equations and about 100 identities in the US model. The
unemployment rate is determined by an identity; it equals unemployment divided
by the labor force. In the identities all flows of funds among the sectors (house-
hold, firm, financial, state and local government, federal government, and foreign)
are accounted for. The federal government deficit is determined by an identity, as
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is the federal government debt. There is an estimated equation determining the
interest payments of the federal government as a function of interest rates and the
government debt.
There are important real wealth effects in the US model. An increase in house-
hold wealth, say from an increase in stock prices or housing prices, leads to an
increase in consumption. Spending out of real wealth is about 4 percent per year
of the wealth change. Real disposable income is an explanatory variable in the
consumption equations. DSGE models like the Galí and Gertler (2007) model
have that property that a positive price shock is explosive unless the Fed raises the
nominal interest rate more than the increase in the inflation rate. In other words,
positive price shocks with the nominal interest rate held constant are expansionary
(because the real interest rate falls). In the US model, however, they are con-
tractionary. If there is a positive price shock, the real wage initially falls because
nominal wages lag prices. This has a negative effect on consumption demand
(because real income is an explanatory variable in the consumption equations). In
addition, household real wealth falls because nominal asset prices don’t initially
rise as much as the price level. This has a negative effect on consumption through
the wealth effect. There is little if any offset from lower real interest rates because
households appear to respond more to nominal rates than to real rates. Positive
price shocks are thus contractionary even if the Fed keeps the nominal interest rate
unchanged.
There are also important physical stock effects in the model. There are four
physical stock variables: durables, housing, capital, and inventories. Lagged one
period, the stock of durables has a negative effect on durable expenditures, the stock
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of housing has a negative effect on housing investment, the stock of capital has a
negative effect on plant and equipment investment, and the stock of inventories has
a negative effect on inventory investment. These stock effects mitigate recessions
and tame booms. As physical stocks get low in a recession, there is, other things
being equal, an increased demand to replenish them, which helps counteract the
recession. The opposite happens in a boom. All these stock effects are estimated—
again no calibration. Another way of looking at these stock effects is that the model
has built in cyclical features. As, say, stimulus measures expand the economy and
stocks are built up, forces are at work that will slow the economy later.
ROW Model
The ROW model consists of estimated equations for 37 countries. There are up
to 13 estimated equations per country and 16 identities. There are a total of 274
estimated equations in the ROW model. The estimated equations explain total
imports, consumption, fixed investment, inventory investment, the domestic price
level, the demand for money, a short term interest rate, a long term interest rate, the
spot exchange rate, the forward exchange rate, the export price level, employment,
and the labor force. The specifications are similar across countries. The short term
interest rate for each country is explained by an estimated interest rate rule for
that country. In some cases the U.S. interest rate is an explanatory variable in the
estimated rule, where the Fed is estimated to have an effect on the decisions of other
monetary authorities. The exchange rates are relative to the dollar or the euro. The
two key explanatory variables in the exchange rate equations are a relative interest
rate variable and a relative price level variable. The two key explanatory variables
7
in the domestic price equation are a demand pressure variable and a cost-shock
variable—the price of imports. In the price of exports equation, the price of exports
in local currency is a weighted average of the domestic price level and a variable
measuring the world export price level (translated into local currency using the
exchange rate). The weights are estimated.
There are 59 countries in the MC model (counting an “all other” category),
and the trade share matrix is 59×59. Data permitting, a trade share equation is
estimated for each country pair. In a trade share equation, the fraction of country
i’s exports imported by country j is a function of the price of country i’s exports
in dollars relative to a weighted average of all other countries’ export prices in
dollars (excluding oil exporting countries). The weights are trade shares lagged
one quarter. A total of 1,302 trade share equations are estimated. Trade shares
for which there are no estimated equations are still used in the solution of the MC
model; they are simply taken as exogenous. The trade share data are from the
IFS Direction of Trade data. Quarterly data are available back to 1960. While the
trade share equations are all quarterly, the structural equations for some countries
are estimated using annual data. Interpolation is used when necessary to convert
annual variables to quarterly variables.
There are many links among countries. The use of the trade shares means that
the differential effects of one country’s total demand for imports on other countries’
exports are accounted for. There are interest rate links through the U.S. interest
rate affecting some other countries’ rates in the estimated interest rate rules. In a
few cases the euro (earlier German) interest rate affects other countries’ interest
rates. Exports are endogenous for each country, since they depend on the imports
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of other countries, which are endogenous. The price of exports in local currency
of each country is endogenous, since they depend, as noted above, on the domestic
price level and the world price level. The price of exports in dollars is endogenous
because the price of exports in local currency is endogenous and the exchange
rate is (for most countries) endogenous. The price of imports in each country
is endogenous because it depends on the price of exports of the other countries
weighted by the trade shares. Since, as noted above, the price of imports affects
the domestic price level in each country’s estimated domestic price equation, there
are price links among countries. An increase in the price of exports in dollars in
one country leads to increases in other countries’ import prices, which affects their
domestic and thus export prices, which feeds back to the original country, etc.
Government Spending Multipliers in the MC Model
Because of the many links among variables in the model and because there are
many simultaneous effects, it is not easy to explain results. There is a danger that
the model seems like a black box. It is not feasible to explain everything in one
paper, and I have tried to deal with this problem by putting all the documentation
on my website. The complete specification of the MC model is presented on the
site, and all coefficient estimates are presented along with tests for each estimated
equation. Also, the complete model can be used on the site, including duplicating
the results in this paper. It can also be downloaded for use on one’s own computer,
which allows all of the equations to be estimated by the user if desired. The
discussion of the results in Section 3 is thus incomplete. Only selected variables
are discussed, and the reader is referred to the website for further details.
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It will be useful before discussing the experiment to show the multiplier proper-
ties of the model regarding U.S. government spending on goods (G) and on transfer
payments (TR). (Both G and TR are in real terms.) Table 1 presents results from
two simulations, one in which G is permanently increased by 1.0 percent of real
GDP and one in which TR is permanently increased by 1.0 percent of real GDP.
The simulation period is 2009:1–2020:4, and the baseline run is the one discussed
in the next section. No other changes were made for the two simulations. In par-
ticular, no tax increases were imposed to pay for the increased spending. These
simulations are not meant to be realistic (or desirable) policy actions. They are
simply meant to illustrate the properties of the model.
Table 1 shows that the peak G multiplier for output is 1.96 after 4 quarters. The
multiplier settles down to about 1.1 after about 16 quarters. The peakTRmultiplier
for output is about 1.1 after about 6 quarters. The multiplier settles down to about
0.4 after about 18 quarters. Physical stock effects, interest rate effects, and price
effects are the main reasons for the decline in the multipliers after the peak. By
2020:4 the debt/GDP ratio has risen by 7.57 percentage points in the G case and
by 9.65 percentage point in the TR case. The larger rise in the transfer payments
case is because of the smaller output increases (and thus smaller tax increases).
Table 2 presents estimated standard errors of the multipliers. These values are
computed using a bootstrap procedure, which is explained in the appendix. The
procedure is roughly as follows. Using the historically estimated errors as a base,
new data sets are created by drawing from this base and solving the model. For
each new data set the model is reestimated, yielding a new vector of coefficient




Deviations from Baseline in Percentage Points
qtr Y U P r debt Y U P r debt
Spending on Goods (G) Spending on Transfer Payments (TR)
2009.1 1.04 -0.23 0.02 0.17 -0.24 0.25 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.14
2009.2 1.64 -0.51 0.10 0.44 -0.39 0.55 -0.16 0.00 0.13 0.22
2009.3 1.88 -0.74 0.21 0.66 -0.38 0.81 -0.28 0.03 0.25 0.31
2009.4 1.96 -0.88 0.34 0.77 -0.37 0.99 -0.39 0.09 0.35 0.38
2010.1 1.94 -0.97 0.45 0.82 -0.33 1.08 -0.48 0.15 0.42 0.47
2010.2 1.87 -1.00 0.57 0.86 -0.26 1.10 -0.54 0.22 0.47 0.58
2010.3 1.77 -0.99 0.67 0.87 -0.15 1.07 -0.57 0.29 0.50 0.72
2010.4 1.67 -0.95 0.76 0.86 -0.02 1.01 -0.57 0.35 0.51 0.89
2011.1 1.57 -0.89 0.82 0.82 0.14 0.94 -0.55 0.41 0.50 1.09
2011.2 1.49 -0.82 0.87 0.78 0.32 0.86 -0.51 0.45 0.48 1.30
2011.3 1.41 -0.75 0.91 0.73 0.50 0.77 -0.46 0.49 0.44 1.52
2011.4 1.34 -0.68 0.93 0.68 0.70 0.70 -0.41 0.51 0.41 1.76
2012.1 1.29 -0.62 0.94 0.63 0.90 0.63 -0.35 0.52 0.37 2.00
2012.2 1.24 -0.56 0.94 0.59 1.11 0.57 -0.30 0.53 0.33 2.24
2012.3 1.20 -0.51 0.93 0.55 1.32 0.52 -0.25 0.53 0.29 2.48
2012.4 1.16 -0.47 0.92 0.51 1.54 0.47 -0.22 0.52 0.26 2.73
2013.1 1.13 -0.43 0.92 0.48 1.75 0.44 -0.18 0.52 0.24 2.97
2013.2 1.11 -0.40 0.91 0.46 1.96 0.42 -0.16 0.51 0.22 3.21
2013.3 1.09 -0.38 0.89 0.44 2.17 0.40 -0.14 0.51 0.20 3.44
2013.4 1.08 -0.37 0.89 0.42 2.37 0.38 -0.13 0.50 0.19 3.67
2014.1 1.07 -0.36 0.88 0.41 2.57 0.38 -0.12 0.50 0.18 3.90
2014.2 1.06 -0.35 0.88 0.40 2.77 0.37 -0.12 0.50 0.18 4.12
2014.3 1.06 -0.34 0.88 0.39 2.97 0.37 -0.12 0.51 0.18 4.34
2014.4 1.06 -0.34 0.88 0.39 3.17 0.38 -0.13 0.51 0.18 4.55
2015.1 1.06 -0.34 0.89 0.39 3.36 0.38 -0.13 0.52 0.18 4.76
2015.2 1.06 -0.34 0.89 0.39 3.55 0.39 -0.14 0.53 0.19 4.98
2015.3 1.06 -0.34 0.90 0.38 3.74 0.39 -0.15 0.54 0.19 5.19
2015.4 1.06 -0.35 0.91 0.38 3.93 0.40 -0.16 0.56 0.20 5.40
2016.1 1.06 -0.35 0.92 0.38 4.12 0.41 -0.17 0.57 0.20 5.60
2016.2 1.07 -0.36 0.92 0.38 4.31 0.41 -0.18 0.59 0.21 5.81
2016.3 1.07 -0.36 0.93 0.38 4.49 0.42 -0.19 0.60 0.22 6.02
2016.4 1.08 -0.37 0.94 0.38 4.68 0.43 -0.20 0.62 0.22 6.23
2017.1 1.08 -0.37 0.94 0.38 4.87 0.43 -0.21 0.63 0.23 6.44
2017.2 1.09 -0.38 0.95 0.38 5.05 0.44 -0.22 0.64 0.23 6.65
2017.3 1.10 -0.39 0.95 0.39 5.24 0.45 -0.23 0.65 0.23 6.87
2017.4 1.10 -0.39 0.95 0.39 5.42 0.45 -0.23 0.66 0.24 7.08
2018.1 1.11 -0.40 0.95 0.39 5.61 0.46 -0.24 0.67 0.24 7.29
2018.2 1.12 -0.40 0.95 0.39 5.79 0.46 -0.25 0.68 0.24 7.51
2018.3 1.12 -0.41 0.95 0.39 5.98 0.46 -0.25 0.68 0.25 7.72
2018.4 1.13 -0.42 0.95 0.39 6.16 0.47 -0.26 0.69 0.25 7.94
2019.1 1.14 -0.42 0.95 0.39 6.34 0.47 -0.26 0.69 0.25 8.15
2019.2 1.14 -0.43 0.95 0.39 6.52 0.47 -0.27 0.70 0.25 8.37
2019.3 1.15 -0.44 0.94 0.39 6.70 0.47 -0.27 0.70 0.26 8.58
2019.4 1.15 -0.44 0.94 0.40 6.88 0.47 -0.28 0.71 0.26 8.80
2020.1 1.15 -0.45 0.94 0.40 7.06 0.47 -0.28 0.71 0.26 9.02
2020.2 1.16 -0.45 0.94 0.40 7.23 0.47 -0.28 0.71 0.26 9.23
2020.3 1.16 -0.45 0.94 0.40 7.40 0.46 -0.29 0.72 0.26 9.44
2020.4 1.16 -0.46 0.94 0.41 7.57 0.46 -0.29 0.73 0.27 9.65
• percent deviations for Y and P , absolute deviations for U , r, and debt.
Y = real GDP, U = unemployment rate, P = GDP deflator, r = three-month Treasury bill rate,
debt = federal government debt/GDP ratio.
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Table 2
Estimated Standard Errors of Government Spending Multipliers
Deviations from Baseline in Percentage Points
qtr Y U P r debt Y U P r debt
Spending on Goods (G) Spending on Transfer Payments (TR)
2009.1 1.04 -0.23 0.02 0.17 -0.24 0.25 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.14
(0.073) (0.036) (0.009) (0.037) (0.167) (0.035) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.038)
2009.2 1.64 -0.51 0.10 0.44 -0.39 0.55 -0.16 0.00 0.13 0.22
(0.096) (0.059) (0.017) (0.078) (0.283) (0.069) (0.027) (0.006) (0.028) (0.085)
2009.3 1.88 -0.74 0.21 0.66 -0.38 0.81 -0.28 0.03 0.25 0.31
(0.115) (0.071) (0.029) (0.092) (0.353) (0.104) (0.043) (0.011) (0.046) (0.133)
2009.4 1.96 -0.88 0.34 0.77 -0.37 0.99 -0.39 0.09 0.35 0.38
(0.124) (0.083) (0.044) (0.104) (0.397) (0.122) (0.060) (0.021) (0.061) (0.172)
2010.1 1.94 -0.97 0.45 0.82 -0.33 1.08 -0.48 0.15 0.42 0.47
(0.142) (0.084) (0.055) (0.095) (0.396) (0.137) (0.068) (0.033) (0.062) (0.203)
2010.2 1.87 -1.00 0.57 0.86 -0.26 1.10 -0.54 0.22 0.47 0.58
(0.166) (0.097) (0.069) (0.100) (0.432) (0.142) (0.073) (0.046) (0.065) (0.217)
2010.3 1.77 -0.99 0.67 0.87 -0.15 1.07 -0.57 0.29 0.50 0.72
(0.177) (0.119) (0.081) (0.106) (0.457) (0.147) (0.082) (0.056) (0.063) (0.238)
2010.4 1.67 -0.95 0.76 0.86 -0.02 1.01 -0.57 0.35 0.51 0.89
(0.173) (0.122) (0.097) (0.107) (0.449) (0.156) (0.089) (0.064) (0.066) (0.250)
2011.4 1.34 -0.68 0.93 0.68 0.70 0.70 -0.41 0.51 0.41 1.76
(0.146) (0.122) (0.141) (0.108) (0.397) (0.129) (0.088) (0.091) (0.086) (0.228)
2012.4 1.16 -0.47 0.92 0.51 1.54 0.47 -0.22 0.52 0.26 2.73
(0.102) (0.081) (0.150) (0.114) (0.360) (0.107) (0.068) (0.108) (0.068) (0.236)
2013.4 1.08 -0.37 0.89 0.42 2.37 0.38 -0.13 0.50 0.19 3.67
(0.106) (0.063) (0.145) (0.111) (0.337) (0.089) (0.055) (0.100) (0.071) (0.242)
2014.4 1.06 -0.34 0.88 0.39 3.17 0.38 -0.13 0.51 0.18 4.55
(0.102) (0.074) (0.144) (0.110) (0.329) (0.086) (0.054) (0.093) (0.062) (0.230)
2015.4 1.06 -0.35 0.91 0.38 3.93 0.40 -0.16 0.56 0.20 5.40
(0.090) (0.064) (0.148) (0.111) (0.324) (0.073) (0.044) (0.086) (0.062) (0.269)
2016.4 1.08 -0.37 0.94 0.38 4.68 0.43 -0.20 0.62 0.22 6.23
(0.085) (0.064) (0.147) (0.113) (0.310) (0.070) (0.041) (0.089) (0.065) (0.378)
2017.4 1.10 -0.39 0.95 0.39 5.42 0.45 -0.23 0.66 0.24 7.08
(0.097) (0.069) (0.145) (0.117) (0.365) (0.080) (0.051) (0.085) (0.068) (0.411)
2018.4 1.13 -0.42 0.95 0.39 6.16 0.47 -0.26 0.69 0.25 7.94
(0.099) (0.074) (0.149) (0.106) (0.433) (0.079) (0.058) (0.092) (0.062) (0.478)
2019.4 1.15 -0.44 0.94 0.40 6.88 0.47 -0.28 0.71 0.26 8.80
(0.117) (0.083) (0.153) (0.119) (0.445) (0.093) (0.055) (0.103) (0.073) (0.590)
2020.4 1.16 -0.46 0.94 0.41 7.57 0.46 -0.29 0.73 0.27 9.65
(0.116) (0.095) (0.165) (0.126) (0.550) (0.103) (0.072) (0.103) (0.089) (0.633)
• See notes to Table 1.
• Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
experiment is performed and the multipliers are recorded. Doing this, say, N times
results in N values of each multiplier, from which measures of dispersion can be
computed. The estimated standard errors in Table 2 are based on 100 trials. The
formula used for the estimated standard errors is presented in the appendix. This
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procedure does not require any assumption about the distribution of the error terms
in the model since the drawing is from the historically estimated errors.
The results in Table 2 show that the estimated standard errors are generally
small relative to the size of the multipliers. For example, the four-quarter-ahead
G multiplier for output of 1.96 has an estimated standard error of 0.124. For
the 48-quarter-ahead G multiplier for the debt/GDP ratio of 7.57, the estimated
standard error is 0.550. There is somewhat less precision relative to the size of the
multiplier for the transfer payment experiment, where the four-quarter-ahead TR
multiplier for output of 0.99 has an estimated standard error of 0.122. The fairly low
estimated standard errors are consistent with results in Fair (2004), which show that
uncertainty from estimated coefficients is generally small relative to uncertainty
from structural error terms. Multiplier uncertainty is from the uncertainty of the
coefficient estimates and not also from the uncertainty of the structural error terms
because the latter cancel out when computing multipliers.3
3 The Stimulus Experiment
Stimulus Changes
The results in this paper are based on actual data through 2009:4 (data available as
of January 30, 2010). The simulation period is 2009:1–2020:4, 48 quarters. The
baseline values for 2009:1–2009:4 are the actual values, and the baseline values
for 2010:1–2020:4 are values from a forecast I made on January 30, 2010. These
3This is exactly true for a linear model and close to being true for typical macroeconometric
models—see footnote 8 in the appendix.
13
values are on my website and are values used in Fair (2010) to examine possible
consequences of future federal government deficits. This forecast incorporates the
stimulus measures (since the stimulus was passed).
The simulation that was run for the experiment has the stimulus measures
taken away. In order to do this, the stimulus measures have to be chosen. This
was done as follows. The stimulus bill has tax cuts, transfer payment increases,
and increases in government purchases of goods and services. (Unless otherwise
stated, “government” in what follows means federal government.) Some of the
transfers are to state and local governments and some are directly to households.
In the model it makes no difference whether the federal government makes transfer
payments directly to households or makes them to state and local governments if
the state and local governments in turn pass on the transfer payments to households.
In either case there is an increase in disposable income of the household sector. To
keep matters simple in the present experiment, all transfer payment increases are
put into federal transfer payments to households. In addition, tax cuts are taken
to be increases in transfer payments to households rather than decreases in the
personal income tax rate in the model. Most of the tax cuts do not involve cutting
tax rates, and so it seems better to put them into transfer payments. Therefore, only
two variables are changed for the stimulus experiment, federal transfer payments
to households and federal purchases of goods and services.
The timing of expenditures is a major issue in trying to capture the effects of
any stimulus package. I have roughly followed the CBO (2009) timing for the
present experiment. I have assumed that the nominal value of transfer payments
is $172 billion larger in fiscal 2009, $370 billion larger in fiscal 2010, $103 billion
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larger in fiscal 2011, $12 billion larger in fiscal 2012, and $11 billion larger (at
an annual rate) in 2012:4. I have roughly spread these increases evenly within the
four quarters of the fiscal year. I have assumed that nominal government spending
on goods is $21 billion larger at an annual rate in 2009:2, $29 billion larger at an
annual rate in 2009:3, $29 billion larger in fiscal 2010, $31 billion larger is fiscal
2011, $24 billion larger in fiscal 2012, and $17 billion larger at an annual rate in
2012:4. No changes in transfer payments and government spending were made for
2009:1. Also, no changes were made after 2012:4. In particular, no tax increases
or government spending decreases were imposed. The total nominal government
spending increase over the four-year period is $762 billion, of which $660 billion
is in transfer payments and $102 billion is in purchases of goods.
The two relevant exogenous policy variables in the model are real federal
transfer payments to households, TR, and real federal purchases of goods and
services, G.4 These are the variables changed for the results in Table 1. To get the
stimulus increases for G the above nominal increases were divided by predicted
values of the government spending deflator from the baseline forecast. Similarly,
to get the stimulus increases for TR the above nominal increases were divided by
predicted values of the GDP deflator from the baseline forecast. Table 3 presents the
stimulus changes for the two variables as a fraction of real GDP from the baseline
forecast. The main increases are between 2009:2 and 2010:3. The increases are
slightly larger for 2010 than for 2009.

























As noted above, the baseline values are actual values for 2009:1–2009:4 and fore-
cast values for 2010:1–2020:4.5 If the actual residuals for 2009:1–2009:4 are
added to the model (with zero residuals used for 2010:1–2020:4) and a simulation
is run for the 2009:1–2020:4 period, the solution values reproduce the baseline
values. (Zero residuals are used for 2010:1–2020:4 because these were used for
the forecast.) In order to have the experiment with the stimulus measures taken
out be consistent with this, the same (actual) residuals for 2009;1–2009:4 were
used (with zero residuals used for 2010:1–2020:4). Given these residuals and the
5For countries other than the United States not all variable values were available through 2009:4,
and when necessary missing values were chosen ahead of time (usually by simple extrapolation).
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new (lower) values of G and TR, the model was solved for 2009:1–2020:4. This
solution is the model’s estimate of what the world economy would have been like
had there been no stimulus bill. Results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 for selected
variables. Table 4 presents results for the United States, and Table 5 presents results
for other countries. Note that the only changes made were to G and TR. No future
tax increases or spending cuts were imposed to pay for some of the stimulus. This
experiment thus does not necessarily represent a realistic (or desirable) long run
policy. It is simply examining the macroeconomic consequences of the stimulus
bill with no other changes made. The values in Tables 4 and 5 are baseline values
divided by or subtracted from the predicted no-stimulus values.
Values are presented in Table 4 for real GDP, employment, the unemployment
rate, the GDP deflator, the three-month Treasury bill rate, the ratio of federal
interest payments to GDP, the ratio of the federal government deficit to GDP, and
the ratio of the federal government debt to GDP. The cyclical features of the model
are immediately evident from Table 4. The stimulus in 2009–2011 has negative
effects afterwards. These effects are mostly from the negative stock effects (durable
stock, housing stock, and capital stock) that were discussed in Section 2. There
are also slight negative effects from the higher price level and the higher level of
interest rates.
The peak output effect is in 2010:3, where output is 3.62 percent larger. The
peak employment effect is in 2010:4, where employment is 3.07 percent larger
(3.757 million jobs). In this quarter the unemployment rate is 1.76 percentage
points lower. The GDP deflator effect reaches a peak in 2011:4, where the GDP




Baseline Values Divided By or Subtracted From Predicted No-Stimulus Values
Percentage Points
qtr Y J U P r int def debt Ja
2009.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.
2009.2 0.72 0.22 -0.16 -0.02 0.12 0.01 2.24 0.27 271.
2009.3 1.69 0.67 -0.47 0.01 0.16 0.02 2.42 0.48 825.
2009.4 2.51 1.25 -0.84 0.13 0.06 0.03 2.16 0.59 1528.
2010.1 3.12 1.86 -1.21 0.30 0.12 0.03 1.98 0.69 2264.
2010.2 3.49 2.42 -1.52 0.53 0.36 0.04 1.86 0.83 2945.
2010.3 3.62 2.88 -1.74 0.78 0.73 0.06 1.79 1.04 3507.
2010.4 3.13 3.07 -1.76 1.06 0.91 0.07 0.13 1.12 3757.
2011.1 2.39 2.99 -1.60 1.27 0.85 0.10 0.31 1.44 3687.
2011.2 1.67 2.71 -1.32 1.42 0.66 0.12 0.51 1.84 3381.
2011.3 1.08 2.34 -0.98 1.49 0.45 0.15 0.68 2.25 2942.
2011.4 0.44 1.87 -0.61 1.52 0.22 0.17 0.23 2.60 2378.
2012.1 -0.08 1.37 -0.25 1.48 -0.02 0.19 0.39 2.95 1763.
2012.2 -0.43 0.90 0.07 1.38 -0.25 0.20 0.51 3.27 1167.
2012.3 -0.64 0.48 0.32 1.25 -0.44 0.22 0.58 3.54 638.
2012.4 -0.79 0.14 0.51 1.10 -0.58 0.22 0.59 3.78 183.
2013.1 -0.95 -0.17 0.65 0.96 -0.68 0.23 0.49 4.01 -225.
2013.2 -1.00 -0.41 0.73 0.80 -0.76 0.23 0.51 4.17 -552.
2013.3 -0.97 -0.58 0.76 0.65 -0.79 0.23 0.51 4.28 -785.
2013.4 -0.88 -0.68 0.74 0.52 -0.78 0.23 0.48 4.35 -927.
2014.1 -0.78 -0.72 0.68 0.41 -0.74 0.22 0.45 4.38 -995.
2014.2 -0.66 -0.72 0.60 0.32 -0.68 0.21 0.42 4.39 -1002.
2014.3 -0.54 -0.69 0.51 0.25 -0.62 0.21 0.37 4.38 -962.
2014.4 -0.43 -0.64 0.41 0.20 -0.55 0.20 0.33 4.34 -888.
2015.1 -0.33 -0.57 0.32 0.16 -0.47 0.19 0.29 4.31 -794.
2015.2 -0.24 -0.49 0.23 0.15 -0.40 0.18 0.25 4.25 -689.
2015.3 -0.15 -0.41 0.15 0.14 -0.33 0.17 0.21 4.20 -578.
2015.4 -0.08 -0.33 0.08 0.14 -0.27 0.16 0.18 4.13 -467.
2016.1 -0.03 -0.26 0.02 0.14 -0.22 0.16 0.15 4.07 -362.
2016.2 0.02 -0.19 -0.03 0.14 -0.18 0.15 0.13 4.01 -265.
2016.3 0.06 -0.12 -0.07 0.15 -0.14 0.15 0.10 3.94 -176.
2016.4 0.09 -0.07 -0.10 0.16 -0.10 0.14 0.09 3.88 -96.
2017.1 0.11 -0.02 -0.12 0.16 -0.08 0.14 0.07 3.83 -28.
2017.2 0.13 0.02 -0.14 0.16 -0.06 0.13 0.06 3.77 31.
2017.3 0.14 0.06 -0.15 0.17 -0.04 0.13 0.05 3.72 81.
2017.4 0.15 0.08 -0.16 0.17 -0.02 0.13 0.04 3.67 122.
2018.1 0.16 0.11 -0.16 0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.04 3.62 156.
2018.2 0.16 0.13 -0.16 0.17 0.00 0.13 0.04 3.58 182.
2018.3 0.16 0.14 -0.16 0.16 0.01 0.13 0.03 3.53 203.
2018.4 0.16 0.15 -0.15 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.03 3.49 219.
2019.1 0.16 0.16 -0.15 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.04 3.45 230.
2019.2 0.16 0.16 -0.15 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.04 3.41 238.
2019.3 0.15 0.17 -0.14 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.04 3.37 243.
2019.4 0.15 0.17 -0.14 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.05 3.34 246.
2020.1 0.15 0.17 -0.13 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.05 3.30 247.
2020.2 0.14 0.17 -0.13 0.17 0.05 0.14 0.06 3.26 246.
2020.3 0.14 0.16 -0.12 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.06 3.23 244.
2020.4 0.13 0.16 -0.12 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.07 3.19 240.
athousands of jobs.
• percent deviations for Y , J , and P , absolute deviations for U , r, int, def , and debt.
• sum of Y changes = $554 billion (0.29 percent).
• average of J changes = 509 thousand (0.37 percent), average U changes = -0.17.
• in 2020:4 federal debt larger by $1005 billion ($637 billion in real terms).
Y = real GDP, J = employment (jobs), U = unemployment rate, P = GDP deflator,
r = three-month Treasury bill rate, int = federal interest payments/GDP ratio,
def = federal deficit/GDP ratio, debt = federal government debt/GDP ratio.
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Table 5
Estimated Stimulus Effects: Other Countries
Baseline Values Divided By Predicted No-Stimulus Values
Percentage Points
qtr Yca Yja Yuk Yge Yfr Yme Ych Yid
2009.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2009.2 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
2009.3 0.49 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03
2009.4 0.95 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.53 0.12 0.03
2010.1 1.50 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.10
2010.2 2.12 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.14
2010.3 2.76 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.19
2010.4 3.26 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.23 2.83 0.61 0.13
2011.1 3.62 0.36 0.35 0.48 0.27
2011.2 3.82 0.38 0.39 0.54 0.30
2011.3 3.89 0.39 0.41 0.58 0.32
2011.4 3.79 0.39 0.41 0.59 0.33 3.75 0.76 0.17
2012.1 3.54 0.38 0.40 0.61 0.34
2012.2 3.16 0.36 0.38 0.60 0.33
2012.3 2.69 0.33 0.34 0.57 0.31
2012.4 2.15 0.30 0.29 0.52 0.27 2.51 0.45 0.12
2013.1 1.57 0.26 0.26 0.48 0.25
2013.2 0.98 0.23 0.22 0.41 0.21
2013.3 0.41 0.19 0.17 0.33 0.16
2013.4 -0.14 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.86 0.08 0.05
2014.1 -0.63 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.08
2014.2 -1.06 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.05
2014.3 -1.42 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.01
2014.4 -1.71 0.08 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.15 -0.12 0.00
2015.1 -1.93 0.06 0.01 -0.18 -0.03
2015.2 -2.08 0.05 0.00 -0.24 -0.04
2015.3 -2.17 0.05 -0.01 -0.30 -0.04
2015.4 -2.18 0.05 -0.02 -0.34 -0.04 -0.47 -0.16 -0.03
2016.1 -2.14 0.04 -0.02 -0.40 -0.04
2016.2 -2.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.42 -0.03
2016.3 -1.89 0.05 -0.02 -0.43 -0.01
2016.4 -1.70 0.06 -0.01 -0.43 0.01 -0.38 -0.10 -0.04
2017.1 -1.48 0.06 -0.01 -0.44 0.02
2017.2 -1.23 0.06 0.00 -0.42 0.05
2017.3 -0.95 0.07 0.01 -0.39 0.07
2017.4 -0.67 0.08 0.02 -0.34 0.10 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04
2018.1 -0.37 0.09 0.03 -0.31 0.12
2018.2 -0.08 0.09 0.04 -0.26 0.14
2018.3 0.20 0.10 0.05 -0.20 0.16
2018.4 0.47 0.11 0.07 -0.14 0.18 0.06 0.03 -0.04
2019.1 0.72 0.12 0.08 -0.09 0.19
2019.2 0.94 0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.21
2019.3 1.14 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.22
2019.4 1.31 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.06 -0.03
2020.1 1.44 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.23
2020.2 1.54 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.23
2020.3 1.60 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.23
2020.4 1.63 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.07 -0.02
Y = real GDP
ca = Canada, ja = Japan, uk = United Kingdom, ge = Germany, fr = France,
me = Mexico, ch = China, id = India.
Values for Mexico, China, and India are yearly.
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from the estimated Fed rule reaches a peak in 2010:4 at 0.91 percentage points.
After the stimulus measures are over in 2012, the negative cyclical features
begin to kick in. The peak negative output effect is in 2013:2, where output is 1.00
percent lower. It is interesting to see how much difference the stimulus bill made
over the entire 12 year period. The sum of the real output changes over the 48
quarters is $554 billion (2005 dollars), which is 0.29 percent of the sum of total
real output. The average number of jobs is larger by 509 thousand jobs, which is
0.37 percent of the average number of jobs. The unemployment rate is on average
0.17 percentage points lower.
Since no tax rate increases or government spending decreases were imposed in
the new simulation, federal government interest payments, the federal government
deficit, and the federal government debt all increased relative to nominal GDP. By
the end of 2020 the debt/GDP ratio is 3.19 percentage points larger (although not
shown, from 67.00 percentage points without the stimulus to 70.19 points with the
stimulus). Interest payments are larger because of the larger debt and the higher
interest rates, and the deficit is larger primarily because of the increased interest
payments.
As noted at the bottom of Table 4, the nominal federal government debt is
$1,005 billion larger in 2020:4. Dividing this figure by the value of the GDP
deflator in 2020:4 gives a value of $637 billion in 2005 dollars. This compares
to the sum of the real output gain of $554 billion. Again, the increase in interest
payments is an important factor in increasing the debt. Comparing $554 billion to
$637 billion, which may seem an obvious comparison to make, ignores discounting.
The output gains occurs essentially in the first three years, and the debt increase
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slowly occurs over time. More will be said about this in the Conclusion.
Table 5 presents output results for other countries. Canada and Mexico have
large effects. For China the peak output effect occurs after three years, at 0.76
percent. The cyclical features of the model are also evident in Table 5; they are
driven by the cyclical effects on the United States. Results for other countries and
variables are available on my website.
Uncertainty Estimates
The bootstrap procedure used for the results in Table 2 can be used to estimate
standard errors for the stimulus experiment. This was done using 100 trials. Again,
the estimated standard errors are small relative to the size of the effects. For the
sum of the output changes of $554 billion, the estimated standard error is $71
billion; for the average unemployment rate change of -0.17, the estimated standard
error is 0.027; and for the average of the employment changes of 509 thousand
jobs, the estimated standard error is 69 thousand jobs.
The estimated uncertainty here is much smaller than that used by the CBO
(2010) in their analysis of the stimulus bill. Table 6 compares the CBO ranges
with the present results for 2009:1–2010:4. In almost every case an estimate here
is within the CBO range. Since the CBO ranges are large, it is, of course, not
surprising that the current estimates are within the ranges.
Table 6 also presents the estimated standard errors of the current stimulus
estimates. For example, the estimated 3.6 percent increase in output for 2010:3
has an estimated standard error of 0.45 percent. This compares to the CBO low
and high estimates of 1.3 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively.
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Table 6
Current Stimulus Estimates Versus
CBO (2010) Ranges






qtr low high current error
2009.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.00
2009.2 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.09
2009.3 1.3 2.7 1.7 0.19
2009.4 1.5 3.5 2.5 0.30
2010.1 1.5 3.9 3.1 0.37
2010.2 1.7 4.5 3.5 0.41
2010.3 1.3 4.0 3.6 0.45
2010.4 1.1 3.4 3.1 0.42
Unemployment Rate
CBO CBO standard
qtr low high current error
2009.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
2009.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.03
2009.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 0.08
2009.4 -0.5 -1.1 -0.8 0.12
2010.1 -0.6 -1.5 -1.2 0.16
2010.2 -0.7 -1.8 -1.5 0.19
2010.3 -0.7 -1.9 -1.7 0.23
2010.4 -0.7 -1.9 -1.8 0.25
Employmenta
CBO CBO standard
qtr low high current error
2009.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
2009.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.03
2009.3 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.09
2009.4 1.0 2.1 1.0 0.13
2010.1 1.2 2.7 1.4 0.19
2010.2 1.4 3.3 1.8 0.25
2010.3 1.3 3.5 2.2 0.29
2010.4 1.2 3.4 2.2 0.30
aemployment is the number of people
employed, not the number of jobs.
22
4 Conclusion
This paper provides estimates of the effects on the world economy from the 2009
U.S. stimulus bill. It has the advantage of taking into account many endogenous
effects. The results show that the output and employment effects over 12 years are
positive, with some redistribution away from 2012–2015 and with an increase in
the federal debt/GDP ratio. The estimated standard errors of the stimulus estimates
are fairly low.
An interesting question is that conditional on the current results being accurate,
was the stimulus bill a good idea? Ignoring redistribution issues, the main cost
would seem to be the increased government debt. How should one think about the
$637 billion real increase in the debt? If there are no bad asset market reactions due
to the larger debt levels, the macro costs of the debt increase might be considered
minor. There is nothing in the MC model that predicts bad macro outcomes from
a rising debt/GDP ratio. The story is, of course, changed if there are in fact bad
asset market reactions, like a large dollar devaluation, a large fall in U.S. stock
prices, or a large increase in interest rates on U.S. government securities because
of added risk. These reactions cannot be predicted since asset-market changes are
essentially unpredictable, which makes it hard to know how to weight the potential
cost of a rising debt/GDP ratio. This issue is discussed in Fair (2010). All that
can be said from the current results is that the stimulus bill led (or will lead) to
an increase in real output over the 12-year period of $554 billion (0.29 percent)
and an increase in the average level of employment of 509 thousand jobs (0.37
percent). The costs are 1) some redistribution of output and employment away
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from 2012–2015 and 2) some increased risk of bad asset-market reactions from a
larger debt/GDP ratio.
Appendix: Computing Standard Errors
There are 1,604 estimated equations in the MC model, of which 1,302 are trade
share equations. The estimation period for the United States is 1954:1–2009:4.
The estimation periods for the other countries begin as early as 1962:1 and end
as late as 2009:3. The estimation period for most of the trade share equations is
1966:1–2008:4. For each estimated equation there are estimated residuals over
the estimation period. Let ût denote the 1604-dimension vector of the estimated
residuals for quarter t.6 Most of the estimation periods have the 1972:1–2007:4
period—144 quarters– in common, and this period is taken to be the “base” period.
These 144 observations on ût are used for the draws in the bootstrap procedure
discussed below.7
The solution period used to create new data is 1954:1–2020:4—268 quarters.
For a given set of coefficient estimates and error terms, the model can be solved
dynamically over this period. Equations enter the solution as data become avail-
able. For example, for the period 1954:1–1959:4 only the equations for the United
6For equations estimated using annual data, the error is put in the first quarter of the year with
zeros in the other three quarters (which are never used). If the initial estimate of an equation
suggests that the error term is serially correlated, the equation is reestimated under the assumption
that the error term follows an autoregressive process (usually first order). The structural coefficients
in the equation and the autoregressive coefficient or coefficients are jointly estimated (by 2SLS).
The ût error terms are after adjustment for any autoregressive properties, and they are taken to be
iid for purposes of the draws.
7If an estimation period does not include all of the 1972:1–2007:4 period, zero errors are used
for the missing quarters.
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States are used. The links from the other countries to the United States are shut off,
and the U.S. variables that these links affect are taken to be exogenous. By 1972
almost all the equations are being used. Actual data for the United States end in
2009:4 and somewhat earlier for the other countries. Exogenous variable values
from the end of the actual data through 2020:4 are the ones that were chosen for
the baseline forecast made in January 30, 2010, which is used in the text.
Each trial of the bootstrap procedure is as follows. First, 268 error vectors are
drawn with replacement from the 144 vectors in the base period. (Each vector
consists of 1,604 errors.) Using these errors and the coefficient estimates base on
the actual data, the model is solved dynamically over the 1954:1–2020:4 period.
Using the solution values as the new data set, the 1,604 equations are reestimated.
Given these new coefficient estimates and the new data, the stimulus experiment is
performed for the 2009:1–2020:4 period—as in Tables 4 and 5.8 The multipliers
8Given the new data and new coefficient estimates, residuals can be computed for the 2009:1–
2020:4 period—1,064 residuals for each quarter. If these residuals are added to the model and the
model is solved for the 2009:1–2020:4 period, the solution values reproduce the values in the new
data set. This is taken to be the baseline run. These residuals and the no-stimulus values of G
and TR are then used for the no-stimulus solution. These no-stimulus solution values can then be
compared to the values in the new data set to estimate the stimulus effects.
Another procedure for the stimulus experiment is the following. Compute the new data set and
new coefficient estimates as above. Then for trial i draw from the historical error distribution (the
144 observations on ût) errors for 2009:1–2020:4. Given these errors, the new data set, and the
new coefficient estimates, solve the model twice, once using the stimulus values of G and TR and
once using the no-stimulus values. For each variable and quarter record the difference between
the two solution values. Do M trials, which gives M values of each difference. Compute the
mean of the M values for each difference, and take this as the expected value of the stimulus
effect. This procedure is a bootstrap within a bootstrap. For a linear model this procedure is not
necessary because the errors cancel out and so each trial gives exactly the same difference for each
variable and quarter. For a nonlinear model (which the MC model is) this is not the case, but a
common property of models like the MC model—see Fair (2004)—is that predicted values from
deterministic simulations are close to mean values from stochastic simulations. This means in the
present context that mean values from the second bootstrap procedure would be close to the values
computed using the one set of residuals. This second bootstrap procedure was not used here.
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are recorded. This is one trial. The procedure is then repeated, say, N times. (Note
that the coefficient estimates used to generate the new data on each trial are the
estimates based on the actual data.) This gives N values of each multiplier, from
which measures of dispersion can be computed.
The measure of dispersion used in the text is as follows. Rank the N values
of a given multiplier by size. Let mr denote the value below which r percent of
the values lie. The measure of dispersion is (m.8413 − m.1587)/2. For a normal
distribution this is one standard error.
The experiment done after each new data set and new set of coefficient estimates
can be any experiment. For the results in this paper three experiments were done
using 100 trials each. Two are the ones in Tables 1 and 2 and one is the stimulus
experiment. The same random numbers were generated for each experiment, which
avoids noise in comparing across experiments. There were 8 solution failures for
each experiment. When a failure occurred, a new draw was taken, so the number of
good trials was 100 (not 92). Ignoring solution failures is likely to bias downward
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